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Abstract 
 
The Wireless Mesh Network (WMN) is ubiquitous 
emerging broadband wireless network. However, the 
open wireless medium, multi-hop multi-radio 
architecture and ad-hoc connectivity amongst end-
users are such characteristics which increases the 
vulnerabilities of WMN towards many passive and 
active attacks. A secure network ensures the 
confidentiality, integrity and availability of wireless 
network. Integrity and availability is compromised by 
active attacks, while the confidentiality of end-users 
traffic is compromised by passive attacks. Passive 
attacks are silent in nature and do not harm the 
network traffic or normal network operations, therefore 
very difficult to detect. However, passive attacks lay 
down a foundation for later launching an active attack. 
In this article, we discuss the vulnerable features and 
possible passive threats in WMN along with current 
security mechanisms as well as future research 
directions. This article will serve as a baseline guide for 
the passive security threats and related issues in WMNs.  
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1. Introduction 
Today WMN are increasingly becoming the 
interests of researchers, end-users and industries. 
Researchers are interested as there are still unresolved 
challenges needed to be addressed before large scale 
exploitation takes place. End-users are interested as 
they need such a broadband technology which is secure, 
available everywhere anytime, and low cost. Industries 
are interested, as this can be the revolutionary 
integrated wireless technology, which is going to bring 
integration between the other wireless and wired 
networks, and is capable to generate huge revenue. 
WMN is a decentralized, low cost, easily deployable, 
self-healing and self-configuring wireless broadband 
network, and these characteristics make it superior than 
other wireless broadband technologies. Other 
broadband technologies such as IEEE 802.11, DSL, 
ISDN and IEEE 802.16 are difficult to deploy as they 
requires centralized controlling, managing, monitoring, 
and expensive maintenance and deployment cost. 
Some features such as the multi-hop, multi-radio 
ad-hoc nature, dynamic mesh topological changes and 
the attack prone wireless medium access of WMNs are 
making it vulnerable to different security threats both 
active and passive attacks. A passive attack is the first 
step toward launching an active attack against the 
wireless broadband network like WMN. The severe 
impact of active attack is the unavailability of 
broadband services or network bandwidth. To minimize 
the possibility of launching an active attack, there is a 
need to address the first-step i.e. passive attacks related 
issues prior to the commercial deployment of WMN.   
This article presents four principal findings. First, 
the important characteristics and different kinds of 
possible passive attacks are pointed out. Second, some 
vulnerable features of WMN are identified. Third, 
consequences of passive attacks in WMN are described. 
Finally, shortcomings of current security mechanisms 
for defending passive attacks are discussed and possible 
countermeasures are introduced. This article will serve 
as a baseline guide for the researchers to address 
passive security issues in WMN.  
 
2. Threat-prone features of WMN 
 
As an integrated wireless broadband technology, 
WMN not only provides internet services to end users 
but also integration amongst different wired and 
wireless networks. Three features of WMN are making 
it vulnerable to different security threats especially 
passive attacks.  
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• Large scale broadband wireless network 
• Multi-hop architecture  
• Ad hoc type connectivity amongst end-users 
devices 
The architecture of WMN is depicted in Fig. 1. As a 
large scale broadband wireless network, WMN is very 
flexible and dynamic in providing internet services to 
end-users. End-users have the freedom to join or leave 
the network from anywhere anytime; hence it is 
difficult to detect active and passive attacks in such a 
vast broadband wireless network.  
 
 
Figure 1. Typical architecture of WMN 
Multi-hop structure is important for flexibility, 
easy deployment and to increase the coverage area of 
WMN, however vulnerable to most of the active and 
passive attacks. Increasing in number of hops creates 
three problems in WMN. 
• Unfair bandwidth allocation. Bandwidth in 
WMN decreases with increasing number of 
hops as ½ of the total bandwidth at first hop, 
1/4th of the total bandwidth at 2nd hop, and 
1/8th at 3rd hop.  
• More possibilities of active attacks.  
• More chances of passive attacks. 
The multi radio ad hoc type connectivity enables  
The end users to access the broadband services through 
another node, if it is not in the direct communication 
range of Access Point (AP) or wireless mesh router. As 
in WMN, the nodes can also function as a router to 
relay traffic for nearby nodes. However, this kind of 
connectivity can again result in active attacks as well as 
passive attacks. As shown in Fig. 1, node D can launch 
active attacks against node I and node H such as battery 
exhaustion attack by forwarding unnecessary traffic to 
them, or act as a blackhole by dropping all the traffic 
going toward them. Similarly, node D can launch 
passive attacks against node I and H.     
 
3. Passive threats in WMN 
 
In passive attacks, the attackers simply analyze and 
listen to the network traffic with the objective to capture 
sensitive information of the target. These kinds of 
attacks compromise the confidentiality of the end user 
traffic. In passive attack, the unauthorized user gain 
illegal access to the network traffic without modifying 
the traffic [5]. Passive attacks are very difficult to detect 
[2] as such attacks do not harm the user traffic or 
normal network operations. In passive attacks, the 
attacker measures the length, time and frequency of 
wireless transmission to get some valuable information.  
3.1 Eavesdropping 
Due to the characteristic of open wireless medium, 
the broadband wireless networks are easily victimized 
for eavesdropping as they use air as a medium for data 
transmission over wireless network connections. To 
eavesdrop such wireless connections are not difficult. 
WMN is more vulnerable to eavesdropping as 
compared to IEEE 802.11. As the IEEE 802.11 
provides broadband services to an organization or 
limited group of users, so the attackers need to be close 
to the premises of an organization to eavesdrop the 
wireless link, while, WMN is a community based 
broadband wireless network which support large scale 
users, so the attackers can eavesdrop any desired 
wireless link easily. The eavesdropper can capture and 
listen to the on-going traffic of communication channels 
using such tools which are easily available.  
Eavesdropping can be successfully conducted with the 
help of sniffers. A sniffer may be an application or 
device which is able to read and capture the network 
packets. The sniffer applications can also be used to 
detect SSID and collect the MAC addresses of the 
nodes. This attack is less severe for the wireless 
network, however more severe for the target user, if 
sensitive information are captured such as credit card 
number, social security number. Strong encryption is 
the possible way to defend eavesdropping.  
3.2 Traffic analysis 
WMN is multi-hop wireless broadband technology, 
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and as the number of hops increases between the source 
and the destination, routing overheads and security risks 
increases. Traffic analysis [6] is a network based attack 
against WMN in which the network traffic is 
intercepted and examined to collect information for 
many reasons such as  
• To locate the source and destination nodes.  
• People in communication. 
• Military intelligence. 
WMN is more vulnerable to traffic analysis due to 
its multi-hop architecture as compared to IEEE 802.11 
which is single-hop. As shown in Fig. 1, node C is two 
hops away from the broadband services, while node D 
is three hops away. In this case, node D is not only 
receiving less bandwidth, but also more vulnerable to 
traffic analysis kind of passive attacks as compared to 
node C. Similarly, node I and H are not in the direct 
communication range of any AP, therefore node D is 
acting as a router and relaying traffic for node I and H. 
Here, if node D is malicious, then it is in the perfect 
position to analyze all the in and out traffic of both I 
and H nodes. Traffic analysis can also be used for 
homing attack, in which the attacker analyzes the traffic 
pattern to locate the gateway [3]. The purpose of 
homing attack is to achieve DoS by jamming the 
gateway to create broadband unavailability.  
Most of the routing protocols tested on WMNs are 
adapted from ad-hoc networks. In proactive ad hoc 
routing protocols, mobile nodes constantly exchange 
routing updates in which can easily be captured by 
adversary to get information about the entire topology 
and nodes location. On-demand routing protocols are 
less vulnerable to traffic analysis as the routes are 
established when needed. However the DSR is still 
vulnerable to passive traffic analysis as the route 
information are kept in packet headers, and if a single 
packet is captured by the adversary then the entire 
routes and forwarding nodes can be judged [1].  The 
defence mechanisms against this security threat can be: 
• Multi-path routing, i.e. establishment of many 
routes between source and destination such 
that adversary will not be able to get all the 
information from a single path. However, 
multi-path routing may increase the routing 
overheads.. 
• Masking i.e. sending continuous encrypted 
signals even the traffic is not transmitted from 
source to destination. 
3.3 Corrupt Access Point   
In IEEE 802.11 WMN, the APs and the wireless 
mesh routers serve as the backbone devices, and nodes 
are connected with it for broadband access. In this 
attack, the attacker accesses the device without 
changing its configuration. Being a large scale wireless 
broadband network, WMN can easily be victimized for 
corrupt AP attack as compared to IEEE 802.11 Wi-Fi, 
as IEEE 802.11 has limited coverage for a single 
organization or target group of users, therefore the 
adversary needs to be closed to the target AP, while 
WMN is community based broadband wireless network 
which can provide broadband services to a whole city, 
therefore the adversary can launch such an attack on 
any nearby AP or wireless mesh router. Once the AP or 
wireless mesh router is compromised then the adversary 
is able to analyse the traffic of all the nodes passing 
through it. Such kind of attack is very difficult to detect. 
One solution to this kind of attack is the periodic 
erasure and reprogramming of the AP [4]. However this 
is not the perfect solution as during the reprogramming 
and erasure process, the end-users will not be able to 
access the network. The attacker usually uses brute-
force approach to break the password of such an AP. 
This attack is more severe in nature, as the adversary is 
now able to monitor the network traffic of all the 
attached nodes. This attack can easily be converted to 
an active attack by dropping the packets or selectively 
forward the network traffic and even can result in a 
Denial of Service attack by disconnecting this portion 
from the WMN. 
 
3.4  War-driving attack   
 
WMN uses free radio frequency bands i.e. 2.4GHz. 
The radio frequency signal may not be confined or 
restricted to a specific area, so any potential attacker 
with a wireless device can gain access to the network, 
and use the network resources. The main objective of 
an organizational secure network is to “keep the 
outsider out” from accessing the organizational network 
resources [7]; such kind of attack is a real violation of 
an organization’s secure network policy. Furthermore, 
most of organizations use broadcast SSIDs and simple 
passwords, so in such case, the attacker can easily 
penetrate into the wireless network. Here if the 
objective of an attacker is just to use the network 
resources of an organization, then it is passive attack. 
But if the objective is to harm the network resources of 
an organization, then it will be an active attack. As 
earlier discussed, the objectives of most of the passive 
attacks are to conduct active attack later. Again due to 
the large coverage area of WMN, the adversary can 
conduct war-driving attack from anywhere.   
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3.5  Brute force attack 
Most of the APs in the same wireless network use 
the same user names and passwords; once known, the 
attacker can get complete control of the network. If 
different passwords are used, then brute force attack is 
used to break the password of an AP or mesh router by 
periodically testing every possible password from brute 
force dictionary. APs having broadcast usernames and   
weak or  static passwords can easily be compromised 
[18]. If the brute force attack is only used for traffic 
analysis then it is passive attack otherwise active.  
After any successful passive attack, the adversary 
has the desired information about the target node/nodes 
and is able to conduct an active attack which would be 
of worse consequences if the target node is the gateway.  
4. Consequences of passive attacks in WMN 
Table 1. Passive attacks with possible defences 
Characteri
stics 
Passive 
attack 
Can result in 
Active attack 
Defences 
 
 
 
Multi-hop 
Homing DoS, 
Jamming, 
Flooding 
Header 
Encryption  
Traffic 
Analysis 
 
 
 
Blackhole, 
Greyhole, 
Wormhole, 
Rushing,  
Secure routing 
protocol  
hop-by-hop 
encryption  
multi-paths 
routing  
Corrupt 
AP 
DoS, routing 
Disruption, 
Network 
partition,   
Authentication 
and 
authorization 
 
Open 
Wireless 
medium 
and 
Ad-hoc 
connectivity 
War 
Driving  
Flooding or 
Distributive 
flooding on 
AP 
Strong 
authentication,  
MAC filtering 
Brute 
force 
DoS (AP),  Strong 
authentication, 
periodically 
change the 
password 
Eaves-
dropping  
Jamming,  
MAC 
selfishness, 
Battery 
exhaustion 
RTS/CTS 
exploitation  
Strong 
Encryption 
Trust 
management 
mechanism 
between nodes 
Digital 
signature 
Authentication  
 
Table 1 summarises the potential passive attacks in 
WMN and the possible defence mechanisms. Passive 
attacks provide a ground for later launching active 
attacks or launching more severe active attack like DoS. 
For example, an attacker get illegal access to wireless 
AP or wireless mesh router using sniffers or using 
brute-force mechanism and passively monitoring the 
ongoing traffic of all the attached nodes. The attacker 
can select a target node for active attacks by selectively 
or fully dropping and/or modifying its packets keeping 
it isolate from performing normal network operations, 
and can result in more severe attack if the attacker 
decides to harm the AP or mesh router by isolating that 
portion of wireless network. 
5. Security mechanisms and possible future 
directions 
Confidentiality can be maintained with the help of 
strong encryption and authentication mechanisms. IEEE 
802.11 WMN uses the following mechanisms for this 
purpose.  
• Wired Equivalent Privacy (WEP) 
• WEP1 
• Wi-Fi Protected Access (WPA1) 
• WPA2 
WEP is implemented in the MAC layer. The shared 
secret keys of WEP are almost static, i.e. remains the 
same even for years. This provides enough time to 
hackers to analyze and hack into WEP enabled wireless 
networks. In light, WAP1 which uses a 64-bit 
encryption (40-bit encryption key and 24-bit 
initialization vector) for both client and AP [10] which 
can easily be compromised by the adversary, and it can 
easily be broken by mean of Brute Force attack [9]. 
Furthermore as the Initialization Vector (IV) is small 
and sent as a plaintext, this may result in IV key reuse 
attack. WEP2 is an updated version of WEP, which 
uses 128-bit initialization vector; however it also suffers 
from the same kind of vulnerabilities as observed in 
original WEP. 
Table 2. Characteristics of WEP and WPA 
Characteristics WEP WPA 
Encryption 
method 
RC4 RC4, TKIP 
Key size 40-bits 128, 192, 256-bits 
Hash method ICV ICV, Michael  
Authentication Optional Required  
Key distribution Manual TKIP 
Vulnerabilities Key reuse 
attack, weak 
encryption.  
Birthday attack, 
Differential cryptanalytic 
attack, DoS,  
 
WPA provides encryption via the Temporary Key 
Integrity Protocol (TKIP) and addresses the weaknesses 
of WEP by providing enhancements such as Per-Packet 
key construction and distribution, a message integrity 
code feature and a stronger IV. However, it needs 
firmware upgrade of the current hardware, and one may 
have to get a new hardware to take the advantages of 
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this encryption mechanism. The length of a WPA key is 
between 8 and 63 characters i.e. the longer it is the 
more secure it is [9]. WPA is also vulnerable to 60-
seconds DoS attack, if the AP detects unauthorized data 
[8].  
WPA2 uses more powerful method of encryption, 
Advanced Encryption Standard (AES). AES supports 
key sizes of 128 bits, 192 bits, and 256 bits. It is 
backward compatible with WPA and uses a fresh set of 
keys for every session. The characteristics of WEP and 
WPA are summarized in Table 2.Keeping in view the 
above limitations of existing encryption and 
authentication mechanisms, we need enhanced security 
systems for the multi-hop ad-hoc broadband WMN. To 
deal with passive attacks and to protect the 
confidentiality, security mechanisms needs to be 
investigated are given in Table 1, and are summarize 
below.  
The utmost priority for the research community is to 
protect this multi-hop broadband wireless network from 
security attacks, in particularly passive attacks because 
they are the starting point for most of the active attacks.   
• Secure routing protocol which is capable of hop-
by-hop encryption so that to defend most of the 
active and passive attacks caused by multi-hop 
architecture of WMN. 
• Trust management and strong authentication 
mechanisms are required to avoid the security 
threats raised by the ad-hoc type connectivity 
amongst mesh nodes. 
• Spread spectrum techniques and enhanced 
encryption mechanisms are desirable to handle the 
security risks enforced by the open wireless 
medium of WMN. 
6. Conclusions  
The broadband nature, multi-hop architecture, 
multi-radio interface and dynamic ad hoc meshed 
topology are such characteristics of WMN due to which 
it is more vulnerable to different security attacks both 
active and passive. Active attacks compromise the date 
integrity and service availability of WMN while passive 
attacks violate and compromise the confidentiality and 
secrecy of nodes and traffic of end users. The passive 
attacks lay a foundation for later launching an active 
attacks either against the wireless network resources or 
end-users nodes. Thus it is necessary to address such 
security issues before the commercial deployment. So 
far, many security mechanisms exist but they are unable 
to protect the confidentiality and privacy of end-users. 
Our finding suggests that to combat passive threats and 
to protect the confidentiality, some improved 
mechanisms are required for the three vulnerable 
features of WMN such as secure routing protocol and 
hop-by-hop encryption to address the multi-hop related 
attacks, trust management and authentication 
mechanisms amongst the end users to overcome the ad-
hoc connectivity challenges, and enhanced spreading 
and encryption mechanisms at physical layer and link 
layers. 
However, any security mechanism, which is 
proposed to address the passive threats in WMN must 
not create other problems such as increase routing 
overheads, slowdown communication, consume more 
bandwidth, create jitter or reduce throughput. Only a 
secure and fast WMN will be highly accepted for 
commercial deployment as a popular wireless low cost 
broadband technology. 
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